(Brave?) New World

In the weeks leading up to the attack many analysts who, after all, have much less access to information than the Russian dictator, were saying things that Putin should have known. For example, that Russia is in fact much weaker than is commonly believed, militarily and economically, and especially technologically. Furthermore, that Ukraine, on the contrary, is militarily stronger and far better prepared than in 2014, when it lost the Crimea and some of its lands in the east of the country. And finally, that the West, despite its internal disagreements and the long-standing insidious effect of Russian propaganda, is likely to react to a potential attack much more strongly than it did six years earlier. It was easy to infer, not from declarations but from actual preventive actions, and to justify: many politicians and experts in many NATO and EU countries were fed up with the Russian diversion openly practised in their backyards, from interference in electoral processes to physical attacks on civilian and military infrastructure. The conclusion was simple: with military aggression, Moscowwill definitely lose far more in many ways than it stands to gain.

However, all these otherwise smart people used these truths to support a conclusion that turned out to be false. They said, Russia will not attack, the military concentration is just a bluff, a flexing of muscles, another episode in the information wars, the Kremlin may be thieves and murderers but they are not idiots.

And yet there were two groups of commentators who were certain that war would break out. First, those few who knew what was really going on because they had at least indirect access to classified sources (either NATO intelligence based on eavesdropping on the Russians’ internal communications or direct Russian sources related to the military or special services). The others were those who, like the majority, had access only to unclassified data but either knew little, or thought in old stereotypical terms, or interpreted facts in a way that defied elementary logic. It turned out that they were right. The attack took place and those who drew true conclusions from false propositions, or knew more than they should have known, can now bask in the glory of prophets.

I am not convinced by the belated regrets of those who put two and two together and, playing by the book, came up with four, not five or three point four. This is a lesson and a warning to analysts and, above all, to the public. It should serve as a reminder that politics is not mathematics; that we need to factor in the irrational much more consistently; and that we should not put too much trust in those who have “recently made a prediction” because it may not be the product of their genius but the outcome of being someone else’s mouthpiece or merely the effect of a one-time stroke of luck.

This story is an important lesson for decision-makers in different parts of the world: the more powerful you are and the more lavished by the court, the more at risk you are of internal disinformation. The events unfolded in a seemingly simple way well known from history. The entourage makes a guess what the ruler wants to hear and, for opportunistic reasons, they tell him just that with complete disregard for the truth. Russian intelligence lieutenants could, and probably did, report how things really are with the West and Ukraine, while mechanised infantry lieutenants reported on what was wrong among their ranks and deep in the garrisons. But the reports became more optimistic at the level of majors, and eventually only good news came from the mouths of the generals surrounding the Tsar. The decision to attack was based on good news. The cold shower came, as we now know, after just a few dozen hours, and has only cooled steadily since then.

Everything that analysts betting on the “Moscow is bluffing” hypothesis were saying just before the war turned out to be true, even more than expected. The strength and quality of the resistance exceeded the wildest expectations, perhaps even those of the Ukrainians themselves. So did the magnitude of the response from the West. No matter that the aid is apparently being cynically dosed out so that Kyiv does not lose the war, but also so that it “does not win too much”, at least for the time being. That aid is at least sufficient to show that Russia is a weak, backward and dysfunctional actor in international relations.

End of Illusions

The most important outcome of the events we have been witnessing, and partly participating in, for the past year may be the widespread loss of illusions about Russia, on several levels. On the political level, it has become apparent that Russia is an absolutely unreliable and unpredictable country. It is obvious that after the pandemic, the whole world needs time to lick its wounds, and the last thing it dreams of is a major conflict and the demolition of supply chains and the energy and food markets. Figuratively speaking, diplomats of many countries have been explaining to the Russians for years how to eat with a fork, but those civilising efforts have failed as the Russians still barge onto the table with their shoes on, break vases and sugar bowls, and slurp directly from their plates. Thus the Russians have helped the “rest of the world” understand what only the immediate neighbours of the Russian empire, who had suffered on many occasions, already knew.

The lesson on the military level is that history, both old and quite recent, can teach us nothing because when the Tsar commands, throngs of poorly armed and trained recruits continue to push into enemy positions crying “hoorah”, and their tanks muddle through minefields which have neither been scouted nor cleared. Losses? Widows get furs to wipe away their tears and the public gets even more crude propaganda. For now, the cocktail of stories about fighting Western fascism, fear of power and generations of trained opportunism is still working. Polls and the Runet suggest relatively high support for Putin and his “special military operation”, but sooner or later it will crack under the pressure of imminent economic meltdown. Western sanctions, especially technological ones, are ruining Russian industry. Hence, for example, the famous relaxation of technical requirements for Russian-made cars (no chips to be had, so they no longer even have to have ABS, airbags or active seatbelts) and, much more importantly, the deterioration in the scale and quality of arms production, which was a vital part of exports, conducive to building political influence. Russia’s crown jewel, that is, its oil and gas exports are also failing. They account not only for almost half of the government revenue but also many jobs and the sense of existence of entire cities or regions.

The cumulative effect is the impending collapse of Russia as a state. There are more than 30 private military companies operating in Russia today (incidentally, they are less and less tightly controlled by the Kremlin), which supply cannon fodder to the front and pacify domestic protests. This suggests that a part of the elite are already preparing for the inevitable: a new time of troubles, a period of internal, probably bloody chaos, and a “redistribution of wealth”, such as control over raw material deposits and the relatively few processing plants fit (once the brawl is over) for lucrative re-entry into the international economy. In this scenario, control of Russia’s nuclear potential is a real treat, not so much to be used for its original purpose as to be monetised. Nothing new under the sun. More than one Russian fortune was made in just this way after the implosion of the USSR.

These developments are, no doubt, prompting China, but especially the West, to get ready. After losing all illusions that a return to some kind of “business as usual” with the rulers of the Kremlin is possible, the focus of the West’s policy shifted a few months ago from seeking ways to freeze the conflict again (the same as in 2014) to building the (political, economic, military, and especially intelligence) capacity necessary to manage the anticipated internal crisis in Russia. The United States was the first to do so, and now other allies are gradually joining in, including those who have traditionally been non-hostile towards Russia (to put it euphemistically). This, however, takes time, which is bought by dosing military aid out to the Ukrainians. When the top leaders feel that the time is right, the process will get a boost.

One more thing worth noting is that this war and its strategic consequences are reinforcing the “de-globalisation” scenario, initiated by the pandemic and further stimulated by the China-US rivalry and the risk of it moving into a “hot phase”. The formation of regional, more compact economic and logistics blocs, the reindustrialisation of many Western countries, the nervous search for alternatives to hydrocarbons in energy: these are just some of the manifestations of this megatrend.

A Chance for Europe

Meanwhile, important transformation has taken place on the Old Continent. First of all, Sweden and Finland have decided to abandon their time-honoured neutrality and join NATO. Never mind that their accession is being delayed, for domestic political reasons, by politicians such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey or Viktor Orban in Hungary. The die is cast. This will completely change the balance of power on NATO’s eastern flank and in particular in the Baltic region. Finally, the Central and Eastern European countries are rearming by putting in significant efforts and with a green light and help from the US.

At the same time, the balance of power in the European Union is shifting. Germany has discredited itself, which will not go unnoticed, although for tactical reasons, not everyone is saying that out loud. After all, in the last decade, Berlin has created at least two extremely troublesome security situations for Europe, each time driven by poorly concealed selfishness (which could be understood and, under certain conditions, even forgiven) and by a dramatic lack of imagination and incompetence. Case one is the “herzlich wilkommen” policy, designed to save the German and European labour market and pension systems through an influx of migrants theoretically willing to work. In reality, it has mainly caused an additional overload of social systems and a dangerous stretching of the capacities of counter-intelligence and police services, and brought back phantoms of political radicalism with a xenophobic tinge. Case two is the long-standing game of making Europe dependent on Russian gas (and oil to a lesser extent). Of course, Germany wanted to gain, economically and politically, as the main hub and distributor, and part of the plan was the suicidal decision to shut down German nuclear power, which was cynically exploited for ideological and propagandistic effect. After the outbreak of war, it became clear that ashes had to be heaped upon heads and apologies had to be made, although in Germany this process was slow and inconsistent, and the hopes of preserving at least part of the dreamed-of “Russo-German empire”, pushing the Americans out of Europe and bringing the remaining unruly countries to their knees, were still alive. The game played around the handover of Leopard tanks to the Ukrainians was symptomatic, and the list is long, including the only seemingly naïve decision to sell shares in the Hamburg port to Chinese companies, resulting in a bitter quarrel between the government coalition, the secret services and their political superiors.

Others are watching this German circus and figuring out what to do next. It seems to be increasingly likely that the European “centre of gravity” will shift further east, to a coalition of pro-American countries in the region, with an important function for Poland at least a as geographical lynchpin, and with an important economic, civilisational and military role of the Swedes and Finns on the one hand and the Brits remaining outside the EU on the other. As an aside, this has not been actively countered by either France (concerned about Russian tactical sabotage in the Middle East and Africa, where the Kremlin continues to bring in “instructors” and money) or Spain (mindful of both its Latin American and domestic interests, as Russian services have been all too active in supporting separatism against Madrid and organised crime groups). Surprisingly, even the new Italian government headed by Giorgia Meloni has turned out to be anti-Putin, even though the coalition supporting it is swarming with Kremlin-linked politicians. This is probably the result of a rational calculation that faced with a weaker Germany, it makes sense to keep good relations with the Anglo-Saxon powers, and to effectively limit behind-the-scenes Russian influence on the Old Continent.

The outcome seems quite positive. In addition to eliminating dependence on Russian energy supplies, which will only be good for Europe, there is the fairly strong campaign of solidarity aiming to eliminate or neutralise Moscow’s agent of influence, which has been on an uninterrupted rise since Soviet times. There has also been a turnaround in the approach to the integration aspirations of Ukraine itself, but also those of Moldova and, in the longer term, perhaps even Belarus and the countries of the Transcaucasus. For all this, the credit in fact goes to Vladimir Vladimirovich and his band of murderers. All this would never have happened without their troublemaking politics.

Time to Draw Conclusions

In the face of a tangible common threat, the solidarity of the Central and Eastern European states has increased significantly, as has the pro-Atlantic attitude of their peoples (the victory of Petr Pavel in the Czech presidential elections is one example). The case of Poland provides food for thought, as the government has for years financially supported and publicly pampered nationalist far right groups, counting on an electoral advantage, and eventually cooked up trouble for itself in the form of Putin’s influential allies. The region looks to Washington and London with more hope today than ever before, and not as a humble client who will settle for beads, but rather as a demanding ally with a sense of common interest who will not hesitate to enter into lucrative cooperation with such exotic partners as South Korea or Taiwan.

In the shadow of the war in Ukraine, which seems distant for them, the countries of the global South are also experiencing their moment of geostrategic reflection. Strong anti-American (or even anti-Western) resentment is a significant piece of the puzzle there, but the sentiment in the street is one thing and the cool calculation of the elites is another. This is why a wide variety of countries, from India through the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf to many Latin American and African states, are refraining from unequivocal support for Ukraine but are also not at all keen to actively work for the benefit of Russia. On the other hand, many of them would have no way of helping Putin, so that consolation prize for Russian propagandists, who claim that well over half the global population is cheering them on in their fight against imperialism, is just empty words and a band-aid for their own battered souls.

This does not mean, however, that the West can rest easy. Russia may no longer be an attractive point of reference for any serious government, but China remains in the game, and it is China that the US, the UK, the EU countries, as well as Japan, South Korea and Australia will have to deal with in earnest. Beijing evidently understands where the sequence of events unfolding over the past year is leading, and wants to be ready both for the collapse of Russian statehood and a new round of competition with the Western world. Surely, China has already concluded that it makes no sense to start a war for which one is not properly prepared; that outdated Cold War-era weaponry is no longer effective on the modern battlefield; that the strength in numbers means little in comparison with genuine quality, while information warfare and the aspiration to win the minds and hearts of the global public is just as important, if not more important, than the square kilometres of ground conquered.

So let us not get carried away with further illusions. The Russian-Ukrainian war will end one day, in a way that is still difficult to predict today. But the “strategic pause” we experienced after the fall of the Berlin Wall is already consigned to history and there is no going back. The events of the last twelve months are just a prelude to many different sequels, probably even more dramatic. The genie has been let out of the bottle. ©℗

This war and its strategic consequences are reinforcing the “de-globalisation” scenario, initiated by the pandemic and further stimulated by the China-US rivalry and the risk of it moving into a “hot phase”

Witold Sokała is a lecturer at the Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, an expert of the Po.Int Foundation and the New Confederation