The Russophobes Were Right. But – So What?

“From the German perspective, the scale of the unconditional aid that Poland provided to Ukraine at all levels: state, local government, non-governmental or human, was something unbelievable", says Dr Anna Kwiatkowska, head of the German Department of the Centre for Eastern Studies. She explains that for years, the discourse in Germany was dominated by the myth of Poles as xenophobes and nationalists. It was a result of, among other things, media coverage after the migration crisis of 2015 and 2016, when Poland (along with other Visegrad countries) opposed the migrants relocation mechanism. By the way: disagreement with EU migration policy and not being open to newcomers was one of the few ties that cinched the region together.

This Is Not a War Against Germany

The region has built a strong coalition to help Ukraine and forced the West not only to change its attitude towards Russia, but also to increase its involvement in the war in the military dimension as well - this narrative is one of the most common in the countries concerned. We feel something along the lines of moral superiority. We were right after all – as opposed to those who called us Russophobes. The states that previously looked down their noses at us have now admitted that their pro-Russian policies were wrong, and this should naturally change Central Europe's role in the EU.

“Has anything changed in a year?” semi-rhetorically asks Dr Kwiatkowska, whom I met during the Berlin conference. “I noticed that the audience has become more receptive to Polish speakers. And seriously: despite a year of war, few people at the conferences, other than Poles and Balts, have such a pointed view of the war and Russia. The Czechs certainly have the same view as we do; however, there are many voices taking a more distanced position”, she says.

Germany, in turn, still views Poland and the Baltic States as separate, due to Warsaw's firmer stance towards Germany's own policy.

“After 24 February, the Germans were very preoccupied with themselves. They were experiencing a shock, caused not so much by the invasion itself as by the fact that Ukraine had not fallen immediately; more, it had put up heroic resistance”, explains the head of the CES German Department. In the space of a few dozen hours, Berlin's vision of the world order crumbled to the ground and Germany had to react somehow. That reaction arrived in form of Chancellor Scholz’s speech in the Bundestag on 27 February 2022. In this speech, he announced the 'Zeitenwende' (literally 'turn of the times' in German, translated into English as 'turning point'). By using this term, the German Chancellor signalled a qualitative change in Germany’s Eastern policy. The word was recognised by the German Language Society (GfdS) as the word of the year 2022.

German society itself is also undergoing change. “However, this requires a reconfiguration of identity, and this is a long-term process”, emphasises Anna Kwiatkowska. There is a growing awareness that for years, society had been virtually soaking up Russian propaganda, the theses of which were even present in public discourse. There was a belief that Ukraine was a hotbed of corruption and Nazism, a people without a true state and nation. “Within a year, this propaganda was removed from the public discourse. It is still present both in the elite and in society, but there is a perception that it is no longer appropriate to speak like this in polite society”, explains Dr Kwiatkowska. In our conversation, she emphasises that the Germans were “dramatically uninformed” with regard to Ukraine, hence this mental change is very slow.

Germany's indecision with regard to aid for Ukraine is causing annoyance not only in Poland. This is compounded by their self-satisfaction over the transfer of Leopard tanks to Ukraine. “Recently, the German Chancellor gave a speech in which he stated that he was playing in the same league as the USA, completely ignoring involvement of Central Europe, which elicited some pitying smiles from this part of Europe”, points out Dr Kwiatkowska. She adds that Olaf Scholz phrased his speech as if he had arrived at everything on his own ‒ including without the experts who support him, and even against them and his own coalition partners in the government.

The experts all agree that no country in the region will support Poland's hard-line policy towards Germany in the long term. This is because, from the perspective of these countries, Berlin is ‒ apart from Paris ‒ the most important player in the European Union and shapes its policy. Other countries do not understand Polish-German tensions. Dr Kwiatkowska points out that at the core of Warsaw's relations with Berlin, there are some structural problems, and that Germany itself shows “soft disregard” to her partners when making policy. “To this day, the source of problems in Polish-German relations is the plethora of empty gestures and using them to cover up differences, avoiding discussion and any efforts to solve real problems. This is exemplified by German platitudes about ‘future-oriented thinking’ and the will to ‘move on’, launched whenever the Poles put forward any specific proposals or demands for clarification or action that are not convenient for the German side”, Anna Kwiatkowska and Wojciech Konończuk wrote in Liberal Culture in their text “Germany-Poland-Ukraine: how to avoid the kitsch of reconciliation?” The outbreak of war in Ukraine has shown that Poland knows how to build coalitions that pressure the Germans, which causes them both surprise and irritation.

“The Polish-German partnership remains extremely important for the future of the region and the European Union”, admits Dr Tomáš Strážay, director of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. He says that Slovakia, like Germany, is still open to Russian disinformation. “In Bratislava, Germany's hesitation with regard to helping Ukraine is seen as an internal problem for Berlin, but not something symptomatic”, he stresses.

Slovakia's approach to the situation may change after the September 30 elections. These raise real concerns in Europe, as one scenario might see the victory of a constellation opposed to involvement in aiding Kyiv. However, the SFPA director points out that there are certain institutional considerations that would render a sudden change in Slovakia's course towards Ukraine impossible. Most political parties are also opposed to such a change.

“If the foreign policy towards Germany is based on the assumption that weakening Germany would strengthen Poland, it must be stressed that this is entirely erroneous thinking”, warns Eugeniusz Smolar. “The point is that France and Germany remain the fundamental keystone of European integration and unity, both in terms of the EU and NATO”, he explains. The CIR expert adds that while Western assistance is neither as extensive nor as rapid as we would like it to be, it is nonetheless being provided and is growing, in concert with Washington.

Currently, Lithuania is taking a firm approach towards Germany, demanding for its commitment to be increased to a brigade. Still, Laurynas Vaičiūnas, President of the Board of Trustees of the College of Eastern Europe (KEW), points out the need to build alliances that are not at counterpoint to Berlin. He emphasises the importance of the Lublin Triangle format, seeing it as a positive example of cooperation between states. “The Lithuanians are aware that the world without the French and the Germans does not exist. Any initiative that promotes European integration is valuable”.

Networks of Mutual Ties and Resentments

“All the countries of the region have united in the face of an external foe”, points out Dr. Gediminas Kazėnas affiliated with Mykolas Romeris University in Vilnius “which allowed for building relations based not so much on elements of shared history, as rather specific security considerations”.

The expert emphasises that security is going to become the new benchmark for relations in the region. The unifying factor will be the efforts to expand NATO to include Finland and Sweden as soon as possible. It is in the Lithuanian capital that the 11‒12 July NATO summit will take place; Vilnius' aspiration is to welcome Stockholm and Helsinki as members of the North Atlantic Alliance at that time. After Petr Pavel's victory in the Czech presidential election, the idea of creating a Poland-Lithuania-Czechia Republic triangle rapprochement also arose (on the initiative of Polish President Andrzej Duda). However, Dr Kazėnas points out that there is precious little talk about this in Lithuania, and Vilnius itself does not really see a role for itself in this format. He sees the reason for such a state of affairs in the “very thin thread on which this format would be built” ‒ that being the Suwałki Gap. According to the expert, Vilnius was, on the other hand, greatly impressed by the expansion of the Polish army. Lithuania wants to spend 3 percent of GDP on this, while Poland will spend 4 per cent. For months, the most important feeling expressed by Lithuanian public opinion with regard to Russian aggression has been satisfaction over Lithuania's and the region's membership in the EU and NATO.

Laurynas Vaičiūnas adds that a certain difficulty with regard to operation of various inclusive formats in the region is posed by... parliamentarism. Development or discontinuation of political friendships in our region is very strongly linked to the electoral cycle. The Visegrad Group used to be one of the most important cooperation formats within Central Europe, but it has been frozen due to divergences between Hungary and the other countries in terms of their approach to Russia and Ukraine. The KEW director is calling to refocus the perceived formats of regional cooperation towards the northern direction. “The importance of the Baltic Sea basin will increase, as a result of NATO enlargement. Partners, including Germany, can be influenced for example through the Council of Baltic Sea States. The open question remains whether Poland is willing to see itself as a Northern state”, he says.

The plurality of regional cooperation formats is not consistent with a unified development strategy or a common vision for the future. Creating such a vision is all the more important as, after the war, the temptation to accentuate the "moral superiority" between the partners is likely to arise. In such an arrangement, mutual resentments will build up, becoming, in turn, one of the main factors blocking the development of Central Europe. “Currently, Czechia has very good press in Lithuania," says Vaičiūnas. “This is was brought about by Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union. It is deemed effective and very helpful. Prague has captured the attention of European politics to an extent that Poland has failed to do, mainly due to its anti-Europeanism”. “Because of its policy towards the European Union and its institutions, Poland is limiting its influence on the EU”, agrees Eugeniusz Smolar.

Until the outbreak of the war, Poland did not have the best press in the Baltic States. According to Laurynas Vaičiūnas, the Lithuanian-Polish rapprochement is a very positive development, but it should also be viewed from a broader, economic and social perspective. “Lithuanian society is becoming increasingly liberal and open; in this respect Warsaw is not the best model for them”.

“In the first weeks after the outbreak of war, civil society communities from the Baltic States sent observers to Poland to learn how to plan such aid properly”, says Dr Damian Szacawa from Institute of Central Europe. The ICE analyst points out the perverse aspect of the situation: they were supposed to learn from a country they perceived as xenophobic. “It becomes possible to reverse this trend, everyone is impressed by Poland's commitment. This bodes well for regional initiatives, as North-oriented activity remained suspended for a long time”.

Anna Kwiatkowska from CES adds that Poland has many allies in Germany as well, but they remain adamant on issues related to the rule of law or LGBT+ issues.

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland ‒these countries have no doubts as to how Russian aggression against Ukraine should be viewed. They also have a common perception of the need to diversify their energy sources. Finland and Estonia have purchased a joint LNG floating port, following a referendum in June 2022. Denmark has given up one of its exemption clauses of opting out of the common defence policy. “There is a lot going on”, summarises Dr Szacawa.

Offer Something Positive

Better press, a better image, breaking through a wall of stereotypes, great solidarity with Ukraine ‒ at a glance, all these seem to have incredible potential. However, Eugeniusz Smolar dampens any excessive enthusiasm. In his view, the unprecedented aid for Ukraine does not translate into an actual increase in Central Europe's political clout. These two issues do not directly result from each other. “Indeed, it has been admitted that we were right about Russia. But literally, this means only that those countries admitted the policy they were pursuing was wrong from the perspective of their own states and the security of Europe. A member of the IRC Foundation Council also explains that the change in attitude towards Russia is not so much due to pressure from, for example, Poland, but rather the war horrors seen daily in the media, news of Russian crimes in Irpin or Bucha, which influences public opinion, as well as recognising that Moscow's actions target the entire West and not just Ukraine”.

Eugeniusz Smolar points out that in the past year, Poland, Czechia or the Baltic States have not undertaken any significant political initiatives that would be offering anything to Europe. “Far-reaching changes have taken place in Europe. Innovative mechanisms were used to revive the economy after the coronavirus pandemic”. For the first time ever, the European Peace Facility decided to provide military assistance to Ukraine. In order to achieve greater influence in the EU, it is necessary to propose integration initiatives that will strengthen common potential.

All analysts agree that the regional rapprochement between the countries must first and foremost be translated into infrastructure projects that will make the region more competitive, and at the same time more convenient for the inhabitants. “I would like to see a fast motorway Warsaw-Vilnius-Riga-Tallinn built, but also a railway line”, says the KEW president. He also points to the need to invest in regional companies to create networks of multinational economic ties. “Today, the hub bringing together companies from different countries in the region is usually Germany”.

Tomáš Strážay is hoping that Slovakia will soon build its road sections in the vicinity of Žilina and Čadca across the border from Zwardoń to connect the two motorways and improve transit. He also points to the growing importance of rail transport. Restoring rail links between the Prešov region and the Małopolskie voivodship should be viewed as a very positive development. According to Mr Strážay, it will be very important to continue efforts towards further diversification of energy supply, even after the war is over. According to the analyst, Central Europe could also play an important role in the eastern policy of the European Union. The Western Balkans primarily, but also Georgia, Moldova and, last but not least, Ukraine are interested in becoming members of the Community. The experience of our region could be useful to countries aspiring to join the EU.

Clout Is Not Granted Freely

Another challenge would be a further enlargement of the euro area. “Remaining outside the Eurozone limits the ability to influence EU policy”, explains Eugeniusz Smolar, pointing out that 85% of the EU's GDP is contributed by countries that are members of the monetary union. “We must remember that Eurozone is the essence of EU's existence, so remaining outside of it perpetuates the unequal influence on its fate”. In the region, Czechia and Poland have not adopted the EU currency.

According to Dr Kwiatkowska, it is very difficult for German decision-makers to accept that Central Europe as a region has started to become an important player on the European arena. It can no longer be gamed as before. “As a region, we need to take advantage of this and realise that clout is not granted, it must be wrenched from others. Therefore, we need European-scale projects such as the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative or the Three Seas Initiative”. Economic development and strong state institutions are essential”, says Anna Kwiatkowska. ©℗