Truce? So Far the War Is Forging Ahead

One of the papers prepared for this year’s Yalta Economic Strategy Forum includes a short note on the development of war scenarios. Its title features a cut-off date that determines the prospect of defeat or victory. It is the year 2030. In a statement from late November, the Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom and former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, reflects on the future course of the war. He refers to 2027 as the year when Russia will lose its operational capability. In his view, major breakthroughs are unlikely by then. This is contingent on technological processes and evolving tactics. “The rise of robots on the battlefield has made soldiers nearly incapable of manoeuvring. This inability to fight against robots led to a stalemate. We could not move forward against the Russians and they could not move forward against us either. There was a deadlock”, the general commented.

Both the YES Forum conclusions and Zaluzhnyi’s words – no matter how we view them – are at odds with the expected diplomatic breakthrough. Neither 2030 nor 2027 offer the prospect of a quick end to the combat. Notwithstanding the fact that in recent weeks talk of a “truce” has become widespread. Whether the Western world understands it in the same way as Russia remains an open question. Yet another dilemma – purely in the context of Poland’s interests – pertains to the issue of whether the authorities in Warsaw should be interested in this mythical truce. And if so, what is the optimal truce for Poland?

The answer to the first question seems pretty clear. Russia defines neither a truce nor a ceasefire the same way the Western world does. It does not consider it a prelude to talks on a lasting peace. It is more like a pause before a new strike or the time it has purchased to reinforce and hit back. Believing in the lasting nature of such a solution is extremely naive. Likewise, Vladimir Putin never intended to abide by the Minsk agreements (the first and second agreements to stop fighting in the Donbas). They were not subject to the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. From the very beginning, they were merely a means of exerting pressure on Kyiv. These instruments facilitated the limitation of Ukrainian sovereignty and provided a means of preparing for full-scale war. Allegations concerning violation of the Minsk agreements represented a prime casus belli. The same will apply to the truce. Should it become a reality, any truce will remain a source of pressure and provocation rather than a path to normality and lasting peace.

The answer to the second question concerning the Polish interest is no longer as straightforward. A truce at the cost of accepting Ukrainian territorial losses means agreeing to a second partition of Ukraine (the first took place in 2014, when the Western world allowed the Kremlin to annex Crimea at almost no cost and trigger separatism in the Donbas). Consenting to a partition in the 18th-century understanding would be a throwback to a time when war and border changes were used as policy instruments. This would be a disaster from the viewpoint of Poland and the entire north-eastern flank of NATO. It is not in Warsaw’s interest to agree to a truce in exchange for partition.

However harsh it may sound, it is then in Poland’s interest for Ukraine to keep the war going in order to maximise the cost of the conflict for Russia and discourage it from using war as a tool to play politics in the region. But is Kyiv ready to do so? In an interview with the daily Le Parisien, Volodymyr Zelensky made it clear that his state lacks the strength and resources to consider recapturing the Donbas and Crimea. However, he has no intention of accepting territorial losses. “The constitution prevents us from doing so”, Zelensky argues. “These territories (the Donbas and Crimea – ed.) are currently under de facto Russian control. We do not have the resources to take them back. We can only count on diplomatic pressure from the international community to compel Putin to negotiate”, he clarified. Indirectly, Zelensky admits he is ready to negotiate. After all, as he puts it, “it does not matter who sits across the table”. Nonetheless, he emphasises that negotiations at this point mean giving Putin the right to “decide on everything in our part of the world”. Instead of freezing the conflict, the solution involves an unspecified “peace plan”. The negotiating option, as expressed to Le Parisien, is therefore above all an escape from the blame game.

For the time being, there is no peace plan. But a set of theses is being formulated by President-elect Donald Trump. These are first and foremost a call for a ceasefire and accepting the fact that Russia occupies almost 20 percent of Ukraine.

The year 2025 will be marked by make-believe talks and further slow progress by Putin in the Donbas. At the moment, his troops are most successful in the southern part of the region. They are approaching Pokrovsk, taking control of westward roads towards the Dnieper. They are also aiming to outflank Kurakhove. In the central Donbas, the Russians are stuck in Chasiv Yar. The Ukrainians are holding the town – a key resistance point for them – before shifting the combat to the outskirts of Kramatorsk.

The Russians, in order to help secure their hold on the Donbas, might feign strikes in other directions comparable to the advance towards Kharkiv in May 2024. The goal at the time was not to capture this city of one million residents. The aim was to stretch the front and gain ground to serve as a bargaining chip in future talks. Developments similar to those in the Kharkiv region could take place in Zaporizhzhia and, should the Russians succeed in their occupation of the Kursk region, in the Sumy direction. Marked offensives are also possible from the north, including – as sources of Dziennik Gazeta Prawna believe – once again, from the Belarus side. It is not a question of a deep incursion into Ukraine, but rather to engage Ukrainian groupings. It will cause confusion and leave Kyiv with a dilemma, since the Ukrainians will not be able to respond to such a scenario by fielding a large number of new brigades to defend threatened areas.

In 2025, Kyiv will continue to find it worthwhile to turn the tables using drone attacks on refineries deep inside Russia (such as the one on 14 December in the Orlovsk region) or on important chemical companies, and military equipment and ammunition production facilities. The targeted assassination scheme is yielding good results, mostly from a psychological perspective. Examples include the recent elimination of the commander of Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense Troops, General Igor Kirillov, or the assassination of Sergei Yevsyukov, the head of the POW camp where Azov Regiment soldiers were imprisoned. There is a high ROI in supporting all anti-Russian forces in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service (HUR) has been involved in Syria, Sudan and Mali. Back in July, even before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, HUR (specifically the Khimik group) collaborated with rebels in an attack on Kuweires Military Airport near Aleppo, where Russian equipment had been stationed. To ensure that the strike received sufficient attention, it was carried out just after Vladimir Putin’s meeting with the Syrian dictator. In winter 2024, the Ukrainians continued to engage with Syrian rebels against Assad’s rule, including training them in the use of FPV drones. Then in July 2024, together with Tuaregs from Mali, they attacked the private Russian military companies (PMCs) established on the ruins of the Wagner Group working for the authorities in Bamako. They have had considerable success, as in both Syria and Mali, confidence in the Kremlin’s support was undermined. Russia was exposed as a state that cannot project its power effectively.

“I think both sides are ready and next year (2025) we will be able to end the war in Ukraine”, said Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, in mid-December. “It’s like a cage fight. You have two fighters and they both want to submit. You only need a referee to separate them. And I think President Donald Trump can do that”, he added.

He sees the end of the war as a ceasefire on the front line, unspecified security guarantees and a moratorium on discussions of Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The outgoing Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, who holds a slightly more informed view of the global situation, expressed a somewhat different view in Foreign Affairs. He believes that there is no willingness on Putin’s side to pursue talks, which limits the options for conciliation. This was the standpoint adopted by outgoing German Chancellor Olaf Scholz following a phone call with the Russian president. As Blinken writes, perhaps Russia’s position will change in 2025.

Perhaps. ©Ⓟ