Proud to Help

Today, a year after the Russian aggression began, there are approximately 2 million Ukrainians living in Poland. However, a breakthrough in the migration processes taking place in Poland took place as early as 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimea and sparked a conflict in the Donbas. Since then, Ukrainians seeking work began to arrive in Poland in large numbers. This was helped by Poles’ positive attitude towards labour immigration from culturally close countries, low unemployment and, above all, liberal laws allowing citizens of six Eastern European countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia) to take up employment with virtually no restrictions.

It was Ukrainians who benefited the most. According to estimates of the Centre for Migration Research at the University of Warsaw, 1.3‒1.5 million Ukrainians were living in Poland before 24 February 2022. The vast majority of them were economic migrants (65 percent of them men) who had the right to temporary residence. In the first weeks after the start of the Russian invasion, around 100,000 of them returned home. In the following months, another 200,000 followed suit. This means that there are still more or less 1 million Ukrainians living in Poland who are not directly war refugees, although they generally cannot or do not want to return home due to the ongoing hostilities and fear for their lives. Meanwhile, their close ones, mainly women and children, have arrived since 24 February 2022. Family reunification took place. As a result, some of the family members (usually the mothers with children) have temporary protection rights while the others (usually the men) only have temporary residence rights, which entails many restrictions, including access to social assistance. This will have to change.

After 24 February 2022, people who had had no previous contacts with our country also arrived in Poland. It was necessary to provide them with accommodation and basic supplies. Importantly, both groups were forced to flee, which involves chaotic decision-making. This is why consistent information was so important in the first weeks, and such information was lacking.

Forced Response

Looking at the state of play one year after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it is possible to draw some conclusions and consider what should be done in the future to face the challenges on the one hand and, on the other hand, to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the presence of the Ukrainians.

As a society, we are proud of the help we have extended to the war refugees. Notwithstanding the delayed response of the government, the lack of professionalism of some regional offices of the central government (in particular in the Mazovian region) and attempts to use the refugees to attack the European Union, an extraordinary social mobilisation took place. The spontaneous yet competent efforts of citizens and NGOs made it possible to avoid a humanitarian crisis on a massive scale. This is a worldwide phenomenon already described in the literature as a kind of model for the response of one nation to the tragedy of another. I would venture the opinion that many of Poland’s successes rely directly on people taking matters into their own hands at a certain point and thus forcing those in power to react.

After an initial period of confusion, the actions of the central government and local governments became complementary, and collaboration replaced the desire to shift responsibilities to others. This is largely thanks to the Joint Commission of the Central Government and Local Governments on Assistance to Refugees from Ukraine. A system that emerged is based on four pillars: the central government, local governments, NGOs, and grassroots initiatives of citizens.

It seems that the period of reception, i.e., taking care of the refugees immediately after their arrival in Poland, went well. No one was left hungry, thirsty, without a roof over their heads or without medical assistance. It was also possible, although not entirely, to avoid the pathologies that accompany mass migrations, especially forced migrations, such as human trafficking, exploitation of refugees (e.g. charging them extortionary amounts of money for minor services), bullying and sexual harassment.

What went less well is the period after the reception, i.e. the efforts made to enable Ukrainians to participate in social activities necessary to have a relatively normal life in Poland. However, there are areas that merit a positive assessment. These primarily include the economic activity of Ukrainians, including their presence in the labour market. According to the Ministry of Family and Social Policy and research conducted at the University of Warsaw, half of adult war refugees have found employment and, importantly, it is not an incidental occupation. In the case of Ukrainians who came to Poland as economic migrants, the proportion exceeds 90 percent. However, there are still more than 200,000 adult refugees living in Poland who are not economically active. This is most often due to the need to care of children and to psychological problems related to the trauma of war and the difficulty of finding their bearings in a foreign country.

According to estimates, around 20 percent of immigrants are in the same or similar profession in Poland as they were in Ukraine. This is not bad when compared with the state of affairs in other countries in the past. However, a lot of talent is being wasted. It is also important to note cases of exploitation of Ukrainian workers. Unfortunately, the response of the State Labour Inspectorate is definitely insufficient.

The Lost Half

The second area which has avoided major problems despite the lack of systemic solutions is health care. In spite of concerns about how the system would cope with an increased number of patients (especially in autumn and winter), nothing really went wrong. There are three reasons for that. First, the migrant networks were efficient: Ukrainians in Poland (similar to Poles in the UK) used the services of Ukrainian doctors provided in a more or less formal way. Second, private medical service providers offered programmes for war refugees. Third, GPs in the public system have shown great empathy. The question is whether this will continue.

Another area where problems have been avoided is housing, but the picture here is not as clear. A large group of war refugees joined their family members. Those who had no one in Poland found accommodation thanks to public funding for their stay in private flats, hotels or guesthouses. The Polish system is the most generous of all EU countries: the costs of sheltering refugees for the first 120 days after arrival are still being covered. However, the housing test will come on 1 March, when the amendment to the Law on Aid to Ukrainians comes into force. From that date on, some 50‒60,000 refugees will have to pay part of the cost of accommodation in residence centres. At a meeting of the Senate committee, answering my question as to whether the government is prepared for this, Minister Paweł Szefernaker said yes. I hold him firmly to his word. In my view, the decision to reduce support is the right one: too long a period of covering living costs can lead to learned helplessness.

At the same time, there must be a system in place to help refugees survive extreme situations, above all, avoid homelessness: people who are unable to support themselves should be placed in temporary accommodation. I am also concerned about the provision in the amendment that allows for the costs of stay to be covered for “humanitarian reasons”. In the absence of a definition of what this means in practice, this could open up room for corruption. Providing support to war refugees has become a lucrative business for some entrepreneurs.

In contrast, where the Polish state has failed unequivocally is education, the most important factor in integrating Ukrainians. According to the Educational Information System and reports of the Centre for Civic Education and Transparency International, out of the 400,000 Ukrainian children staying in Poland, only less than half attend classes in Polish schools. The others are supposed to study remotely according to the Ukrainian curriculum. However, we do not know whether this is actually happening. The Ministry of Education and Science has left Ukrainian teachers, Ukrainian parents and their children on their own. This may cause a serious problem with dozens or even hundreds of thousands of teenagers, frustrated and cast out of society. Educationalists and psychologists know what this means. The time to act is now. The problem must be rectified in the new school term.

In conclusion, the last year has been a challenging time for Polish society and for local and central governments dealing with war refugees from Ukraine. Overall, we are passing the test quite well although, as pointed out above, cardinal mistakes in education will take their toll in the future. What will be crucial in the coming months is a decision on the residence status of Ukrainians in Poland. The Temporary Protection Directive is due to expire in August. I expect that the European Union will extend it for 12 months. However, this does not change much from the point of view of stabilising the situation of Ukrainians in Poland. Those who have decided to stay here must be allowed to obtain permanent residence. Granting them temporary residence, as proposed, does not solve the problem. Although there is a consensus among politicians (apart from some Konfederacja members) that Ukrainians should be supported, the election campaign will not be conducive to introducing systemic solutions. The PiS government may be afraid to regulate their situation, knowing that a part of the electorate will not like it and may turn to Konfederacja. The time to decide about residency rules and fix the situation in education is now. I strongly encourage this. ©℗

Maciej Duszczyk is Professor at the University of Warsaw with the Centre for Migration Research and the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies. He works, among others, with the International Organization for Migration and the World Bank