A Region at a Turning Point in History

In Central Europe, Hungary and Serbia currently constitute an alliance which is heating up tensions. Budapest openly supports Milorad Dodik, who foments separatist sentiments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hungary does not regard Russia as an enemy state; Fidesz politicians in the European Parliament did not vote in favour of a resolution recognising Russia as a terrorist-financing state. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić meet at least once a month and discuss the situation in the region.

The importance of this alliance has increased after the Visegrad Group turned its back on Budapest. Vučić is heating up the situation around Kosovo, which one might try to interpret as an effect of the accepted perspective that people expect spectacles”, says Marta Szpala of the Centre for Eastern Studies. She adds, “Serbs and Kosovars have seen the war with their own eyes, they know what it looked like. Another thing is that it is not entirely clear who would fight, and the Balkans are depopulating. Young people are emigrating to the EU, while mainly pensioners remain on the ground. The Balkans are facing a depopulation crisis in 2023, when a hard-to-predict number of citizens will emigrate in pursuit of a better future”.

“Undoubtedly, had the war been fought differently, had Russian troops quickly seized Ukraine, then it would have been conducive to taking action to change the political order in the Balkans”, says Adam Balcer, programme director of the College of Eastern Europe. “The Serbs love Russia”, he adds. “As experts point out, Serbia's approach to the war has been changed by the collapse of the myth of Russia, as we have been witnessing since February 2022”.

Poland and Hungary – Bad Blood Between Brothers

One thing that Russian aggression has definitely changed is the approach to existing alliances in the region. Looking from the Polish perspective ‒ political friendship with Hungary did not survive the toughest test. It came down to differences between Poland and Hungary in their approach to the war in Ukraine. The Hungarian point of view remained unacceptable to even the greatest supporters of an alliance with Budapest, and the Visegrad format went into freeze. The prime ministers didn’t meet for more than eight months, nor did the presidents or heads of diplomacy for a year. Despite declarations that the V4 group has potential, partners ‒ above all those from the Czech Republic and Slovakia ‒ look towards Budapest with intense distrust.

When a few weeks ago, Viktor Orbán wore a scarf with the outline of Greater Hungary ‒ within the borders before the Treaty of Trianon (1920), as a result of which Hungary lost two-thirds of its area and a similar percentage of its population ‒ he was asked if there was a broader vision behind the scarf, such as rebirth of Greater Hungary. He remarked that politics should not be mixed with sport. A seemingly innocent joke is nevertheless taken very seriously in neighbouring countries. “Slovakia has very real concerns about the reshaping of security architecture in the region, which has been further accelerated by the war in Ukraine. But there are also real concerns about the activities of Hungary, which is acting to destabilise the region”, says Professor Piotr Bajda of Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw (UKSW). According to the expert, “Bratislava is watching Budapest's activities very closely”.

In turn, the recently concluded Czech six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union was largely entangled with Hungary's veto actions. Szczepan Czarnecki, an analyst at the Institute for Central Europe, points out that certain actions from Budapest were sometimes interpreted by the Czech administration as being undertaken merely out of spite for Prague, to ensure that its presidency would not be a success. In turn, the Hungarian authorities explained the freezing of the Visegrad format as a result of the political crisis in Slovakia and the anticipation of presidential elections in the Czech Republic.

Another country in the region that perceives Hungary's policy in unequivocally negative terms is Romania. “Bucharest perceives Russia as the primary threat to regional security, but Hungary and its aggressive policy to create autonomy in parts of Transylvania comes second”, says Jakub Pieńkowski, an analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). “The Romanian perspective is stronger than the Slovakian one as there is a strong memory of the fact that Romanian troops have appeared in Budapest twice over the course of history”, the PISM analyst adds.

What Is Next for the Three Seas Initiative?

The outbreak of war revealed the emergence of a new order, which was supposed to include Britain, Poland, the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and Romania. However, it seems that ‒ with the exception of Bucharest ‒ such a cooperation was already in place. London's involvement has changed, but this was due to internal political considerations. Why is Romania not getting involved in this potential new project? According to Jakub Pieńkowski, Romania's foreign policy is based on a reactive approach rather than initiating things. Bucharest does not usually show much initiative. The central point of its approach is to avoid conflict with others.

This year, the Three Seas Initiative summit will be held in the Romanian capital. As we have heard from several sources, the venue has been chosen somewhat by force due to the lack of interest from the other new member states (of which there are twelve in total). Since the Riga Summit in May, the Three Seas Initiative is supposed to focus on helping Ukraine. The problem, however, is that the individual partners do not show much political will to develop the initiative further. The budget of the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund still remains at an unchanged level of commitment. The individual states, with the exception of Poland (pledging EUR 750 million) and Slovenia (EUR 23 million), have declared the smallest possible contribution that entitled them to sit on the Fund's Board, i.e. EUR 20 million. Slovakia and the Czech Republic, as well as Austria, have still not joined the initiative.

We obtained a statement from Minister Jan Lipavsky at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. He indicated that the Czech side “perceives the Three Seas Initiative as an important political initiative and form of cooperation within the Central and Eastern Europe region”. As the Minister indicated, “after the conclusion of our presidency of the Council of the European Union, we will analyse which specific projects the Czech Republic should participate in financially. As far as possible future areas of involvement are concerned, from our perspective, energy projects or digital connections could be considered”, he added.

“Romania looks at Ukraine as a competitor”, says Jakub Pieńkowski. Ukraine's survival is in Bucharest's interest, but Romania does not want Kiev to emerge from the war stronger. This is because of the large minority population in the border regions. Another issue is the rivalry over the Republic of Moldova, the PISM expert adds. The Romanian civilisational complex, according to which Romanians are supposed to be the heirs of Latin civilisation, is also important for this puzzle.

What does Moldova itself have to say about this? The situation in the country will be extremely important. “From Chisinau's perspective, the developments in Ukraine are the priority, as there is a deep conviction among Moldovans that the troops are defending Moldovan independence”, says Dr Piotr Oleksy of the Institute of Central Europe and the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. It is vital to maintain support from the West in order to survive the critical energy situation, including giving up Russian supplies, for which money is needed, seeing as energy prices have already risen sharply.

Dr Oleksy points to another interesting process that he believes may well happen in Moldova, namely some or other version of building an understanding with the separatist Transnistria. The war has changed a lot. In the opinion of the IEE analyst, the most likely option would involve building an accord under the supervision of the West. Transnistria has, in fact, lost the capacity for energy blackmail of Chisinau on the scale it used to have. Moreover, it is Moldova that has the leverage over Transnistria. Withholding gas supply to Transnistria has disrupted electricity production. The American ambassador stepped in to mediate between the parties. As a result of the agreement, Moldova has increased gas shipments to Transnistria and the separatist republic will thus produce more electricity. As Dr Oleksy points out, the issue of Transnistria's subjugation to Moldova has gathered powerful momentum. “At one time, I would have said that the process would take at least a decade”, he stresses.

Elections Will Impact alliances

The shape of regional alliances will largely be determined by how the war ends and the terms under which peace will be achieved, acceptable primarily to the Ukrainian side. There are, however, important internal considerations as well. In just a few months, parliamentary elections will take place in Slovakia. This could result in a major reshuffling of the political scene, with pro-Russian politicians potentially returning to power, such as Robert Fica (SMER) or Peter Pellegrini (H'LAS). These politicians will be pushing for the elections to happen as soon as possible. Fico himself is a supporter of the Hungarian approach to the war in Ukraine.The Czech Republic has become unequivocally anti-Russian. The 2023 presidential elections will not result in significant adjustments, as the powers of the head of state are considerably limited. “What may change is communication, which is important in times of crisis, when all institutions speak with one voice”, says Szczepan Czarnecki.

Estonians will go to the polls in March. “It is not clear what the outcome of these elections will be. Surveys that could indicate a trend will only emerge in January or February”, says Bartosz Chmielewski, OSW expert. Then we will see how support for Prime Minister Kallas is going to change over time. The Baltic States have been hit hard by the economic crisis. Latvia's energy situation remains dire, the country is becoming poorer and the least prosperous among the Baltic States, which frustrates the Latvians themselves.

Important political developments worth mentioning also include the elections that are to take place in Lower Austria. Dr. Piotr Andrzejewski, an analyst at the Western Institute affiliated with the Polish Academy of Sciences, mentions historical experience: whoever wins there usually wins in the entire country. The ÖVP, Austrian People's Party, which has been in power for years, is in political crisis. At the same time, Dr Andrzejewski points out that a non-public wing has emerged in Austria, represented by the MFG ‒ Menschen-Freiheit-Grundrechte (People-Freedom-BasicRights). It is an anti-Covid and Eurosceptic grouping (formed in 2021). It has already had some success in the Upper Austrian state elections, and in 2022 in municipal elections in both Lower Austria and the Tyrol. Dr Andrzejewski points out that it is a political movement that spends almost no money on election campaigning and its structures are not fully known.

Pre-term elections are also likely to happen in Bulgaria. No government has been formed since the parliamentary elections held in October 2022. A technocratic cabinet is in power. “It has all the necessary prerogatives. Nobody is in a hurry to hold early elections, as there is no certainty that MPs would renew their mandates, while at the same time 'nobody' is responsible for the current situation”, says Jakub Pieńkowski. The prolonged difficult situation with regard to energy and the economy is conducive to the growth of support for pro-Russian parties.

Dr Jan Muś from the Institute for Central Europe estimates that social protests in Croatia are possible in the spring, when the Croatians themselves run out of patience with the actions of the Cabinet, which, although it led Zagreb to the euro and the Schengen area, was nevertheless able to quarrel about EU funds. The situation will be exacerbated by rising inflation, as well as a potential recession.

Similar protests could also sweep through the Balkans in the spring. Food prices ‒ flour or oil, which are the basis of the people's diet ‒ have risen by at least 25 per cent. Fuel prices have doubled. “This is not about inconvenience, but about genuine austerity with regard to food and heating”, explains Marta Szpala. While it is still possible to cope in forested regions by obtaining wood in a “less formal manner”, so to speak, in the cities there is no such option.

All possible options for alliances will be most affected by developments in the war situation. Whether Ukraine maintain its territorial integrity and to what extent, what will be the situation and position of Russia, will Europe revert to a business-as-usual relationship with Moscow? Will it squander its shift away from Russian hydrocarbons? These are the variables that will re-arrange the order in the countries of the Central and Eastern European region and the Balkans. ©℗