It’s the European Arms Industry, Stupid

Decoupling Is Here to Stay

On top of that, America under Biden is taking energetic steps to reverse its industrial decline and Trump, if he wins, is likely to continue this policy of “decoupling”, especially in the arms industry. The gap between Chinese and US arms manufacturing capacity has become so enormous, that there is a growing bipartisan consensus that should the stand-off over Taiwan turn into a shooting war, America will be hard-pressed to restock its armed forces.

US policymakers are rediscovering belatedly that it is not really about the size of militaries or even how much countries spend on defence, where America still leads the world, but how quickly they can restock their arsenal.

And the numbers aren’t pretty. By several estimates, the US capacity to produce basic artillery shells and drones is several times lower than that of China. The same goes for churning out navy ships, planes, or tanks.

America may produce the world’s most advanced weapon systems and best tanks, but in numbers that would prove insufficient if a major conflict broke out or, in an even worse scenario, it would have to fight on two fronts – with Russia over Europe and with China over Taiwan.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has exposed this risk so clearly that regardless of who runs the United States in the next decade, a revival of the US industrial power to produce arms seems inevitable.

Europe Must Assume Responsibility for Its Defence

Europe must follow suit. Even assuming an optimistic scenario about America’s continued commitment to NATO and Ukraine under Biden or Trump, who tends to contradict himself and confound mainstream expectations, it is painfully obvious that Europeans can no longer take for granted that America will continue to be the main guarantor of their security.

At Visegrad Insight, we have recently outlined in a report several strategic scenarios for Europe, and even the most optimistic one assuming continued US support for NATO and Ukraine is a call for action if the European Union wants to ensure peace, democratic freedom and prosperity for its citizens.

It should not be misinterpreted as the old French idea of “strategic autonomy”, understood as pushing Americans out of Europe and striking a grand bargain with Russia. That story is over. France’s attitude to Moscow has hardened and aligned with that of Poland and the Baltic states, whose warnings about Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions were falling on deaf ears in Paris and Berlin for two decades.

NATO remains the pillar of Western defence and deterrence, but Europeans must finally find a way to make a much greater contribution to it.

The chief task for Europe in the next five years will be defending and integrating Ukraine. Brussels, Berlin, Paris, Rome, and Warsaw must all assume in their strategic planning that the entire burden of financing and rearming Ukraine may have to fall on the European Union. Even if in the end the US will remain a significant contributor. Planning for the worst-case scenario rather than wishful thinking should guide Europe.

Ukraine’s EU Integration Is Not a Choice, but a Necessity

The decision to start accession negotiations with Kyiv at the EU summit in December follows declarations by the EU and several key EU governments that Ukraine’s membership is a strategic necessity, rather than a choice, in the face of Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions.

The chief problem at the moment is how to match bold statements with meaningful actions. Actions which will help Ukraine sustain its war effort here and now and actions that will strengthen the EU’s defences against Russia in the longer term.

The challenge is not just to overcome political divisions exemplified by Viktor Orban’s vetoes of more funds for Ukraine. Basic risk management indicates that the likelihood of Hungary or other weak links in the European decision-making architecture using their vote in the EU Council is there to stay.

The same pragmatism should inform leaders that changing the EU treaties to facilitate more majority voting, which is a logical and sensible way forward to overcome deadlocks and make the EU more efficient, is a song of the future.

It lacks sufficient popular backing among the EU citizenry, can divert leaders’ attention and exacerbate rather than allay political divisions within and among EU member states. In any case, it will take years to agree on the details and win national approval in 27 EU nations, several of whom will have to hold referenda on the issue.

We should acknowledge that Europe needs to act now. Rather than count on institutional changes to deliver, the EU must exploit existing avenues to get the business done. The declarations of the Commission and the EU Council about greater coordination of the defence industry are steps in the right direction. But again, they urgently require more determined action and funding.

It is not necessarily true that consolidation of this industry and state-sponsored partnerships touted by some countries are the optimal way forward. National rivalries and sensitivities may hamper such a top-down approach and delay delivery in the quest for the EU-wide consensus. Another path would be for the EU governments to start placing massive long-term contracts with manufacturers.

European arms suppliers badly need government orders to invest in capacity, and once money starts flowing, the venues for industry consolidation, and partnerships will open up. Some risk-taking is unavoidable.

EU nations must also discover the utility of the “coalitions of the willing”. Like-minded countries must not be stopped from forging ahead on European defence or support for Ukraine under the pretext that this hurts the EU as a whole.

A recent announcement by Germany that it will double bilateral military aid to Ukraine in the face of Orban’s resistance to the disbursement of EU funds is a step in the right direction. And so is the declaration of Poland’s new Prime Minister Donald Tusk that Warsaw will seek closer strategic and defence cooperation with the Nordic and Baltic countries who share the same determination to support Ukraine and deter Russia from any further attack.

This is not about trying to form an alternative to NATO or bypass the EU. On the contrary, Finland’s and Sweden’s alignment with NATO makes it a good conduit for such regional cooperation to boost the eastern flank. The number of troops, tanks, and drones that allies can muster makes NATO’s Article 5 deterrent more credible.

In fact, if European leaders are frightened of Trump’s threats to pull the United States out of NATO, the best way to make him change his mind is to demonstrate that Europe has finally taken defence seriously.

Europe must show it is ready to be an asset rather than a liability for collective Western security. European leaders must also realise that boosting European defence may become a much more attractive proposition for European citizens than treaty changes. It will create economic growth, help revise industrial capacity, and give Europeans a badly needed confidence boost.

And greater confidence in the European project may eventually convince Europeans that further integration is indeed the next step. ©Ⓟ