War Without End

It is similar in the EU. Victor Orbán also constructed a fairly straightforward deal: he demanded the unblocking of EUR 30 billion for Hungary from the National Reconstruction Plan and the Cohesion Fund in exchange for giving up his veto on a EUR 50 billion programme to support Ukraine. The European Commission tried at the beginning to argue that there was no question of combining the two topics. Finally, Balázs Orbán, the head of Hungary’s Prime Minister’s Office, in an interview with Bloomberg explicitly said that if all EU money for his country was unblocked, then the government would withdraw the veto.

Viktor Orbán himself went even further. He put the debate about the state of Ukraine on the agenda and asked whether its EU aspirations should be revisited. “Its rapid admission to the EU would have unpredictable consequences. Accelerating accession would not serve the interests of Hungary or the EU”, he said. He argued that the time elapsed between Kyiv applying for EU membership and receiving candidate status was too short: it was only four months, while as a rule the assessment process takes several years. He concluded by saying that the idea of Ukraine’s membership of the EU was “absurd, ridiculous and frivolous”. In his view, it would require an additional EUR 190 billion over seven years, meaning that every member state would become a net contributor to the EU budget.

In the end, Orbán agreed to open accession talks. But this consent cost him nothing as any EU country at any stage of the negotiations can block them. One need only cite the example of Turkey, which has been integrating with the EU for decades and is unlikely to finalise the process. Although it is, unlike Ukraine, a state with established borders and much richer.

He Says What They Think

Ukraine’s problem is that many politicians in the EU quietly support what Orbán says out loud. No matter how much Slovakia and Hungary differ, populist Robert Fico would sooner give up power than support Ukrainian efforts on the road to EU membership. The climate is equally hostile in the Netherlands, where Geert Wilders’ chauvinist Freedom Party won the election. The same person who opposed the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement signed after the 2014 Maidan protests.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, in an interview with Russian pranksters aired at the beginning of November, spoke of ‘great fatigue on all sides with the war’ and that ‘the moment is approaching when a way out is needed’. She also mentioned disappointment at the lack of support for Italian efforts to combat migration. Germany, which supports Ukraine’s war effort, has to reckon with the growing influence of the extreme-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which in some polls appears to be the first political force in the country. France, on the other hand, has completely disappeared from the diplomatic manoeuvrings surrounding Kyiv. So has Poland, which is now focusing its efforts on securing NATO’s eastern flank. This NATO border is seen as another area of rivalry with Russia. The most probable scenario is behaviour that does not constitute a war but rather infringes the sovereignty of NATO member states.

After Donald Tusk took power, the narrative towards Ukraine is warming. However, the content of policy towards the country is unlikely to change. Poland will no longer supply weapons because it does not have them. The only kind of help could be the transfer to Kyiv of what is dubbed the ‘Warsaw Battalion’, made up of those who are avoiding conscription in Poland. It is estimated to number at least several brigades (one brigade is approx. 3000–5000 soldiers).

In Poland, concerns about the collapse of the Ukrainian state have also diminished. From the north, including from Belarusian territory, a renewed attack on Ukraine is probably not possible for the same reasons that the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the south failed. The border and border areas have been fortified and mined. There is also no chance of rapid change on the Dnieper line and on the frontline in the Donbass, even if cities such as Maryinka or Avdiyivka fall into Russian hands.

In the US, on the other hand, the Ukraine issue has been held hostage to the internal migration debate, but also to Donald Trump’s own attitude towards Ukraine and his pre-war reluctance to seek compromising material on President Joe Biden’s son Hunter from his time doing shady business in Ukraine. The Republicans themselves are blocking an aid package for Kyiv in an attempt to force the White House to accept more spending to protect the border with Mexico. The linking of these two issues shows how downgraded the problem of war in Europe has become in the US. There is also a feeling among the Democrats themselves that this subject should fall on the shoulders of the big EU countries and they should manage a diplomatic solution, while the US should focus on Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Biden’s security adviser Jake Sullivan suggests that responsibility for managing the process would be taken over by Germany in such a scenario in a renewed leadership partnership with the US. This harks back to George Bush’s speech in Mainz in 1989, when communism was close to collapse and when the US expressed its readiness for a united Germany to manage change in Central Europe. Berlin would now manage the change in the former USSR, offering bridging solutions to Ukraine and Moldova, but also, for example, to Georgia. They would have the status of being associated long-term with the EU, supported by pre-accession funds, possibly admitted to common EU policies, but without full membership in the foreseeable future.

The effect of this is likely to be an effort to freeze the conflict in Ukraine. The question, however, is what kind of freeze? And with what security guarantees for Ukraine?

Freeze the War

In the case of NATO, the issue does not look optimistic. In 2024, a summit is planned to mark the 75th anniversary of the Alliance. Democrat-linked analysts from the influential Atlantic Council are calling for a concrete offer to be made to Kyiv and to go further than the 2023 Vilnius Summit, which in retrospect appears to have been a meeting without a conclusion.

In October, three members of the Atlantic Council presented a report in which they argued that the only guarantee of security for Ukraine, but also for NATO’s eastern flank, is full membership of the Alliance. Former US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst, former US Ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute and former NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow also said what Biden is increasingly saying – if Vladimir Putin is not stopped at the Dnieper he will go further and threaten the state of the north-eastern part of the Alliance. That is, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland, against whom Russia has already generated a border crisis.

However, as the DGP reports, in addition to this official hawkish view, the same think tank unofficially in the summer of 2023 probed Ukraine about agreeing to talks to freeze the conflict along what is called the demarcation line. That is, where a Ukrainian counter-offensive to the east and south would realistically occur, in return for forcing Russia to end air attacks to the west and north of that line. One element of this proposal was a guarantee that Ukrainian skies would be protected by the air defences of Alliance countries. This is currently seen as a realistic option in NATO. The Russians are attacking with cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and drones, and none of these weapons are manned. There is no risk of a Russian pilot being killed, so there is also zero risk of an escalation of the conflict.

Ukrainian diplomats speaking over comms equipment were said to have categorically rejected the proposal to freeze the conflict. But as one DGP informant argues, face-to-face they talked differently. The fierce attitude while talking on devices stemmed from the fear of having an unpopular position on the Dnieper recorded and published in the media.

Reports of such proposals, however, indicate that freezing the conflict is being considered. This can also be confirmed by surveys conducted by the Ukrainian authorities in which this question is asked. Some of the research is conducted by the Office of the President and the government and the results are not made public. They show, for example, that the closer to the front line one gets, the more support for a scenario leading to a ceasefire increases. Interestingly, this is also the trend in Galicia, which is the main recruiting resource for the army and thus suffers the highest casualties.

The state of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, the state’s mobilisation capacity and rampant corruption are also important factors. Winter 2023 is marked by roundups of those who have so far evaded military service. The state has taken radical steps against such people. However, this has not led to a significant increase in people being conscripted into the army. Instead, it raises serious questions about the rule of law in Ukraine. No one from the authorities in Kyiv can answer the question on what legal basis the men are detained and why are they deprived of their liberty without charge? It is not clear on what basis soldiers from recruiting offices gained the right to organise arrests and brutalise detainees.

There will be a much more serious question regarding the rule of law in Ukraine in 2024 when parliamentary and presidential elections are due to be held. Volodymyr Zelensky officially argues that it is not possible to organise elections during the war. However, he has unofficially asked politicians from his own party Servant of the Nation to make changes to the electoral law in order to carry them out. Among other things, MPs have proposed excluding ‘certain’ districts from voting. This would be decided by the Verkhovna Rada in cooperation with the Central Election Commission and the special services (HUR and SBU). This provides a huge opportunity to draw the map of constituencies. Deciding where voting will take place would take into account, for example, the threat of terrorism by saboteurs. In practice, such a threat exists throughout Ukraine. One can imagine a situation in which Servant of the Nation politicians see a particular threat in those areas where the popularity of the party is lowest or support for the president is moderate.

A solution to the problem of legitimacy could be the election of a prime minister who comes from an opposition party. This would be the choice of the Verkhovna Rada. According to unofficial information obtained by DGP, the US is pushing for such an option.

Russia Is Waiting

In the Ukrainian question, however, the most important question is about Russia itself. What are its objectives at this stage of the war?

The failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive and less than a year until the US elections, in which Donald Trump has a good chance of returning to power, plus the growing reluctance to help Ukraine in Europe, all suggest that the Kremlin will wait. From Russia’s point of view, there is no reason to enter talks when Kyiv’s position is deteriorating by the day. In this sense, Putin’s goals have not changed. The war has been ongoing since 2014 as well as the annexation of Crimea. During this time, Ukraine admittedly humiliated the Russian army and defeated it in the 2022 land war, but lost a fifth of its territory, including access to the Sea of Azov.

The Kremlin seems poised for another decade of this war against Ukraine. If Kyiv does not get real security guarantees, including a steady supply of heavy weapons and ammunition, it could be targeted again in a decade’s time, depriving it of Donbas and expanding Russia’s hold on the south of the country.

Ukraine could, of course, win. For this to happen it needs guns and ammunition, a lot of ammunition. This war is all about resources and strength. There is no indication that the West is ready for the feasible option of completely defeating Russia in Ukraine through force and confrontation. Unfortunately, Ukraine itself does not seem ready for the prolonged and total mobilisation that would make this possible. ©Ⓟ