Miscalculations of the West

Lack of adequate preparation on the part of the Russians to carry out the operation they had decided on - as a result, they used up their resources very quickly. The Ukrainians were quite lucky, as Moscow had the potential to succeed quickly.

And the reaction of the West did not surprise you?

The West, despite appearances to the contrary, has acted sluggishly. And it was not its assistance that stopped the Russians. It was their own incompetence, unfounded self-confidence and the weather that did it. The West is helping Kyiv - certainly much more than many expected - but still, this help is not at the level required for it to win. It has been a year since the second invasion of Ukraine, and only now is there talk of sending Western tanks. And this equipment is long overdue in Ukraine.

It is we - on behalf of Kyiv - who have to use all sorts of political and diplomatic tricks to force Western partners to decide on such support. Time-consuming games are being played as the Russians prepare to strike again. At this point, the Ukrainians should already be driving Western tanks and flying Western fighters. My impression is that because of the euphoria of stopping the first Russian strike, the West started to think that the Ukrainians had already won. Today we can see how wrong these calculations were.

What possible scenarios do you see for the course of the war?

I have consistently said that Putin’s strategic goals have not changed: it is to take control of the whole of Ukraine. At the same time, the Kremlin is running out of time due to economic and social problems. Therefore, I believe that there will be a second strike on Kyiv. Today, we see that the Russians have recovered from their defeat and the economic problems caused by sanctions are forcing them to seek a quick end to the war. On the other hand, the Ukrainians are also hoping for some kind of landslide battle in which they defeat Russia. With both sides throwing everything they have into the fight; the conflict could even end this year. Although it should be remembered that both sides are also preparing for a scenario in which a stalemate on the battlefield prolongs the conflict for years. I think the latter is less likely. If both sides suffered devastating military losses, then a ceasefire or peace talks could occur. And here two possibilities arise. If the Russians were to recognise their defeat - and thus their inability to conquer Ukraine - this would be an opportunity to draw the country into NATO. This is important because only security guarantees for Kyiv can protect it from another invasion. If a peace is concluded, on the basis of which Ukraine remains a neutral (and therefore solitary) state, then Moscow will strike again after rebuilding its military potential.

How would you define a Russian victory?

It must take control of the whole of Ukraine, including Kyiv. Anything else would be a failure. Taking over part of Ukrainian territory would give it nothing. Politically, it would remain isolated, its geopolitical situation would be more difficult than before 24 February 2022. The same would happen in the economic dimension. Sanctions would finish off its already failing economy. Putin needs to subjugate the whole of Ukraine in order to be able to put pressure on the West and try to obtain concessions that interest him.

And a victory for Ukraine?

For the Ukrainians, the victory would be to defend their independence and to obtain a guarantee to join NATO. Only after receiving it will they be sure that the Kremlin will not attack a third time. This would allow the reconstruction of a devastated country. A state of affairs in which Kyiv would have to maintain a million-strong army in fear would lead to an economic meltdown and perhaps to political collapse in the country. So the Ukrainians today have to gain another 20‒30 years without war, otherwise, they will have no chance of getting back on their feet. In this context, taking back all Ukrainian territories to reach the pre-2014 borders is not necessary. The declaration in this regard is an important message to the West and Moscow. But in the end, Ukrainians will have to decide whether to accept changes to their borders. I believe that the Donbas territories seized in 2014 will remain with Russia. Crimea is recoverable because for that there will be support from many Western countries and Turkey.

And what will the situation in the region look like in three to four years?

Let us focus on two scenarios. If Russia occupies Ukraine, then annexes Belarus and moves on to Moldova. Putin will want to control the entire border along NATO’s eastern flank. In order to deploy an army across its width and put pressure on the West. At the same time, he will divert all forces and resources to waging a hybrid war against Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States. This would be a fatal scenario for us. We would be the place where critical infrastructure facilities would explode, we would have to deal with other acts of terrorism, as well as civilian casualties. Finally, we would lose out economically because of the high-security risks. So would the region as a whole. Western capital would start to flee, and this would result in higher unemployment, lower GDP and lower budget revenues. This, in turn, would translate into less investment and stifled development. And let us not forget that the Stalinist occupation methods used by the Russians in Ukraine would have led to up to 10 million people fleeing to Poland. We would not be able to cope with such a burden. In this scenario, the US would have to decide to wage a second Cold War with Russia and maintain a huge army on NATO’s entire eastern flank. But this would not just be a NATO problem. The destabilisation of the eastern part of the EU would also have a disastrous effect on economies in the west of the continent. Everyone from Germany to Portugal would lose out. This state of affairs could last for several years, but ultimately Moscow would lose this contest. However, this victory of the West would be very costly. Especially for Europe.

And the second scenario?

If Russia loses the conflict in Ukraine, its internal collapse will occur much more quickly. There could even be a break-up of the Russian Federation between 2026 and 2028, and certainly, the perspective of such a scenario will be apparent. So Putin is now struggling to stave off the spectre of an eruption of problems that have consumed the Russian state for decades but have been swept under the carpet.

What is your view of Poland’s activities since the beginning of 2022?

Our foreign policy should be rated very highly. Not only are we doing everything we can to support our neighbour, but we are also Kyiv’s representative in the West. This is a very important role because President Zelensky has limited leverage. We are different. Poland - on behalf of Ukraine - can fight with all its might to increase aid to those fighting. At the same time, Poland’s geopolitical situation and its role in the context of coordinating support for Ukraine is irreplaceable. This has made it possible to overcome the reluctance of the Joe Biden administration towards the authorities in Warsaw, and thus to renew close relations with the United States.

But with some other allies our relations are difficult.

The direction of foreign policy is right. And most importantly: we are acting effectively. We were able to put pressure on Germany - e.g. the supply of tanks to Ukraine or on the issue of the Patriot anti-aircraft system. Of course, Berlin will not forget this. German pressure on Poland - also exerted through EU structures - will be with us for years. One should be aware of this. However, our strategic objective is to keep Ukraine alive and guarantee its security. If they sleep peacefully in Kyiv, so will we. So we should not look at the possible political costs in our relations with Berlin, because if Ukraine collapses, it will be a disaster for us. We have other priorities and worries than Berlin’s dilemmas. Germany is a key economic partner for us, but its political stance is, due to its sluggishness, detrimental to Poland, the EU and NATO. If the German authorities are not capable of making the right decisions on their own, then we cannot accept this state of affairs. They are the richest country and the largest economy in Europe. It is high time that they lead the EU and NATO and set an example. In the meantime, one cannot avoid the impression that we are dealing with a German donkey that has developed a taste for Russian oats and that the stubborn animal must be dragged away from the manger by force. The attitude of the German elite is not only inadequate on many issues, but it is also irresponsible. The Polish authorities seem to be aware of this and are indeed pursuing a very active policy in this regard. This will cost us in the future, but these costs will be nothing compared to those we would have to bear if Russian soldiers stood on the Polish-Ukrainian border. We must not allow this to happen.

You say that we will not be on good terms with Germany in the near future. Who should we focus on then?

We should create political, economic and security links with countries in the region: Ukraine, the Baltic States and, very importantly, Romania. Of course, the policy should be as broad as possible, but these countries should be the backbone of the project. Our priority should be to bring Ukraine into the EU and NATO. We also need to invest in a strong army with the potential to operate beyond the country’s borders. So that it becomes a political tool that will translate into our strength in the region. The political credibility we have already built for ourselves and a strong army are assets that can benefit us in the future.

You are talking about the Three Seas Initiative, rather than the EU. So how will the Community develop?

This depends on how and when the conflict in Ukraine ends. In my view, the United States and selected Western countries will not allow Putin to occupy the country. Although such a scenario cannot of course be disregarded. Should Russia fail, the European Union and NATO will expand. Perhaps not only by Ukraine. Nor would I rule out settling accounts with partners who have not shown solidarity when push comes to shove. I am referring to Hungary. Political isolation, legal sanctions, and perhaps depriving Budapest of the right to vote in Western structures could push the Hungarians out of both the EU and NATO. The resolution of the rivalry with Russia in favour of the West, as well as the internal collapse of the Federation, would allow the US to focus entirely on challenges in the Far East. In view of this, the now-forming bloc of Central European states will be severely tested as Paris and Berlin will want to regain control of the EU. The project of federalising the Union will become crucial for them. But the more pressure is put on it, the more opposition it will generate. At the same time, there may be a clear division of the Eurozone into the indebted South and the ‘miserly’ North. Tensions within the zone - where there is no consensus on how to manage the single currency - will discourage countries outside the zone from adopting the euro. Which in turn will lead to huge tensions within the EU. I have already encountered questions about how long Poland’s participation in the EU will be worthwhile. Meanwhile, the key question for the fate of the Community is: how long will Germany accept the current shape of the Community in the face of its inability to increase its control over it?

So will the future of the EU be decided in Berlin?

The idea of building a ‘two-speed Union’, which has been thrown into the public arena, could turn into a German attempt to run forwards. The creation of an inclusive political bloc within the EU would leave the rest of the Community members out of the picture. I believe that the creation of a two-speed Union would be the end of the EU. In the short term, the Union could expand. In the longer term, however, the drive towards EU federalisation will breed internal conflicts within the Community, and this could ultimately lead to division and the de facto death of the Union without it being officially declared.

What would have to happen to prevent the death of the EU from taking place?

The right path for its sustainability and development would be a return to the concept of a multi-state union, in which the introduction of common ideas and rules - including economic ones - is not linked to the creation of a new political hierarchy. One in which Brussels presides over governments in individual capitals. The problem is that the leaders of the largest EU countries are determined to create a superstate. Meanwhile, the concept of federalisation has no chance of materialising. During the war in Ukraine, many countries found out that Germany, for example, is able to put its own interests above those of the Community. That being the case, Berlin’s power in EU structures cannot be increased, as there is no guarantee that it will be able to act in the interests of all members. Recent years have clearly shown that money has a nationality. Politics has a nationality. Both the Germans and the French have proven this by pursuing their own projects without looking at others. This lack of credibility on the part of Berlin and Paris, together with the desire of these capitals to dictate the direction in which the Union is to evolve, will lead us all in the wrong direction.

And where will the focus of world politics be in a few years’ time? Will the US actually move to the Pacific?

American ambitions will always include a presence in Europe. The US, on the other hand, wants this presence to come at the lowest possible cost. And when the Americans minimise these costs, then there is talk of their ‘exit’ from the Old Continent. But this ‘exit’ is conventional. Only a major collapse of the United States could make it withdraw completely from the international political game. As for the Far East, I don’t think the Americans have as much of a problem there as they do in Europe. The Chinese are so dependent on the West and have so many internal problems of their own that they will not be able to realistically oppose the US for a long time to come. Of course, there will be an escalation of tension between Beijing and Washington, but we should not see Chinese aggression against Taiwan, for example. The key to the situation is the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese are using Kim Jong Un to keep Japan and South Korea in check. These countries are allies of Washington, so it must react. And we saw such a response under President Trump when the US Navy assembled three aircraft carrier groups in the region. This scenario could happen again: Beijing will press Pyongyang again, so the Americans may threaten to strike North Korea in response. The Chinese will then certainly demonstrate their readiness to defend their ally. However, I believe that both sides would lose too much in a war, so a deal could be reached between Beijing and Washington, contrary to popular opinion. This one would have to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue, it is about the potential demilitarisation of the two Koreas and their unification process, as well as the Taiwan issue.

And how will China-Russia relations evolve?

The two countries are in a different situation when it comes to competing with the US. The Russians felt self-sufficient, and the Chinese economy is basically dependent on Western markets and oil and gas imports by sea. The Russians have been at war in Ukraine for a year. They are suffering but are able to continue their aggression for a while yet. Meanwhile, China’s economy would collapse on the same day that the country invades Taiwan. China is plugged in and integrated into the world market. Their prosperity is linked to this. This difference is also crucial to Russian-Chinese relations themselves. Beijing’s aim is to benefit from the global economic and political system for as long as possible. Each additional year of economic growth brings it closer to realising its far-reaching plans. In view of this - despite their harsh declarations - the Chinese will not go to war with the States. They will patiently endure the effects of the US-led trade war, and when they feel the sanctions are too onerous - they will use Kim. They will remain on the sidelines. In the end, an agreement is likely to be reached as a result of escalating tensions in China-US relations, unlike the Washington-Moscow duo, where the Russians have decided to dictate terms using military force. Since the Chinese will be more willing to make deals - in exchange for benefits, of course - that means they will also be willing to leave Russia alone. Thus, I would not expect an alliance between Moscow and Beijing. On the contrary, if Russia were to weaken as a result of losing to the West, then it would become an easy target for China.

Where will Japan, which recently announced a radical increase in defence spending, go from here?

Tokyo must follow the US lead or recognise its own subordination to China. A third way is to acquire nuclear weapons and try to maintain the balance. The latter, however, will not be able to continue indefinitely. If the US were to revert to a policy of isolation - which is possible in the long term - then the Japanese will have no choice but to come to an understanding with China and recognise its superiority in bilateral relations. On the other hand, as long as the United States is active and seeks to maintain the current world order, Japan will be its loyal ally. At the same time, the militarisation of the country will continue. Tokyo has no other option.

Will the world in 2030 be a place where fewer people die because of wars than in 2022?

It is extremely difficult to make judgements in early 2023 about whether, where and what conflicts will erupt in seven years. In December 1999, the biggest worry for the West was the millennium bug, the fear of an IT apocalypse linked to the date shift to the year 2000. In 2001, we had terrorist attacks in the US and the invasion of Afghanistan. In 2003, the second Gulf War broke out . In 2008, the Taliban began to retake Afghanistan and the US had to increase its troops there from 24,000 to 100,000. In 2011, the Arab Spring erupted, leading to civil wars in Libya and Syria. In 2014, Russia started its first invasion of Ukraine, seizing Crimea and the Donbas. Also in 2014, the Islamic State made several conquests in the Middle East, and it took until 2019 to neutralise this threat. At the same time, it must be remembered that America only withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan in 2021. Who could have foreseen wars in Afghanistan or Iraq in 1999? Who could have predicted in 2009 that the regimes of countries in North Africa and the Middle East would start to fall one after the other? Who could have predicted that Putin would strike Ukraine in 2014? The world may turn out to be calmer in 2030 than it was in 2022, but just as many other regional conflicts could erupt. The situation in the Middle East is temporary, with peace hanging in the balance. Conflicting interests between the many players interested in the region make us sceptical about its future. The Taliban are back in charge in Afghanistan, and for years they have dreamt of taking over Pakistan and acquiring its nuclear weapons. India, China, and Pakistan are arguing over Kashmir. Kim is blackmailing South Korea, Japan and the US. These are all local problems that will begin to grow if tensions in the US-Russia-China triangle escalate. Fear of hegemon intervention has so far blocked many destructive processes. If the US policing weakens or focuses only on one or two directions, neighbourhoods neglected by it will have to face increasing crime. There are enough flashpoints to think that much more time has to pass before the situation - globally - stabilises. ©℗